Judgments

SUMMARY OF COMPLAINT:

THE PLAINTIFF, Kaden LaSalle, actioned the Los Santos Police Department (a.k.a LSPD or the Defendant) in the amount of $110,000 as a result of an allegedly unlawful vehicular impoundment. 

The Plaintiff justified the $110,000 relief in the following ways: (1) loss of income, $20,000; (2) temporary loss of property, $10,000; and (3) mental anguish, $80,000.

The Plaintiff’s action was supported by: (1) Article I(10) of the Constitution of the State of San Andreas; (2) Title VIII (8.102, 8.105) of the San Andreas Criminal Code; and (2) Title IX (9.07) of the San Andreas Criminal Code. 

SUMMARY OF JUDGMENT:

IT IS THE OPINION of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of San Andreas, Irene Atkins, (the Court) that the Plaintiff be awarded $10,000 in compensatory damages and $5,000 in punitive damages from the Defendant.

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT:

§1. In the matter of “loss of income”:

IT IS THE OPINION of the Court that a tangible dollar value for lost income as a result of the action was not sufficiently proven to justify compensatory damages. For the purposes below, the Plaintiff was awarded $0 of the $20,000 requested in compensatory relief. 

The Plaintiff testified that due to loss of vehicular usage, he was limited for storage in using another vehicle. Specific details to the vehicular storage were not provided. The Plaintiff also provided, by way of a medical report, that he had to wait between one and three weeks to retrieve his vehicle from Mors Mutual Insurance Company (MMIC), where the vehicle was sent for impounding. To the knowledge of the Court, MMIC does not carry these types of penalties anytime a vehicle comes in their possession. Neither the Plaintiff nor the Defendant provided testimony to corroborate or deny these claims. 

§2. In the matter of “temporary loss of property”:

IT IS THE OPINION of the Court that any law enforcement agency (LEA) within the State of San Andreas, when such an agency has the jurisdiction to enforce Title VIII of the Criminal Code, may, in lieu of financial penalties, order the impounding of a vehicle which was used in a crime sufficient to justify removing it from the road. Any LEA which has determined that impounding a vehicle is necessary must document the incident accordingly. Further to the documentation of the incident, the LEA must also charge the accused with any charges that they would have otherwise received, without any other penalties. That is to say that they may not be issued further fines or serve time for the crimes which they have been accused. 

Pursuant to Article I (12) of the Constitution of the State of San Andreas, commonly referred to as the cruel and unusual punishment clause, in any instance where a vehicle is impounded in lieu of the typical punishments associated with a given penalty under Title VIII of the Criminal Code, or any other Title which addresses the issue of road safety, the total value of the impounding must be less than or equal to the equivalent value of fines associated with such offences. 

In this case, the Plaintiff sufficiently proved that the total value of the impounding of their vehicle was in excess of $10,000. The total value of fines associated with the offences the Plaintiff would have been charged with was $5,000. The Defendant is liable for violating the cruel and unusual punishment clause in the amount of $5,000. The Plaintiff was awarded $5,000 of the requested $10,000 in compensatory relief. 

§3. In the matter of “mental anguish”:

IT IS THE OPINION of the Court that the Plaintiff did not provide sufficient evidence to justify the total claim of $80,000 in compensatory relief. 

The Plaintiff provided evidence that they would require mental rehabilitation as a result of the incident by way of a medical report produced by Dr. Zara Qumar. In this report, a quantifiable fee for such services was not provided. No other testimony or evidence supported the financial burden of such mental rehabilitation. 

As mental anguish as such is not clearly defined in any Code, Act or other law of the State of San Andreas, the Court decided to operate under Civil Code Title V entry 5.2.3 Emotional Distress to determine the eligibility of compensatory relief. 

The Plaintiff provided sufficient evidence to show that the Defendant was liable for unlawful behaviour which resulted in emotional distress. As the Defendant was determined to be liable for unlawful punishment of the Plaintiff in the amount of $5,000, the Court has determined an equivalent amount of compensatory relief should be awarded for emotional distress. The Plaintiff was awarded $5,000 of the requested $80,000 in compensatory relief. 

§4. In the matter of further punitive damages unrequested by the Plaintiff:

IT IS THE OPINION of the Court that the Plaintiff be awarded $5,000 in punitive relief to cover 50% of the Court fees associated with pursuing this action.

SUMMARY OF COMPLAINT:

THE PLAINTIFF, Melvin Diaz, actioned the Los Santos Police Department (a.k.a LSPD or the Defendant) in the amount of $11,909 as a result of an allegedly unlawful vehicular impoundment. 

The Plaintiff justified the $11,909 relief in the following ways: (1) medical attention, $3,300; and (2) temporary loss of property, $8,609.

The Plaintiff’s action was supported by: (1) San Andreas Criminal Code Title IX entries 9.05 Self Defence and 9.06 Necessity; and (2) San Andreas Criminal Code Title I entry 1.302 Aggravated Assault. 

SUMMARY OF JUDGMENT:

IT IS THE OPINION of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of San Andreas, Irene Atkins, (the Court) that the Defendant is not civilly liable for the incident pertaining to this action.

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT:

IT IS THE OPINION of the Court that the Plaintiff did not sufficiently proof, on a balance of probabilities, that the Defendant was liable for criminal negligence pertaining to Aggravated Assault.

The Defendant sufficiently proved that the Plaintiff did in fact strike first. Further, it was proved that sufficient measures were taken to arrest the Plaintiff without unnecessary force. In the moment of the attack, it was shown that the Defendant was already armed and acted responsively. It is necessary to note that 9.05 Self Defence does mandate less or equal force. In this case, a force in excess of the attack was used. For this reason, the Defendant was not proven to have acted in self defence for the purposes of 9.05 Self Defence and any precedent which may be drawn from this case.

SUMMARY OF COMPLAINT:

THE PLAINTIFF, Evangeline Cyrus-King, actioned the State of San Andreas alleging emotional distress and the withholding of property following the passing of her husband, Mr. Elliot King.

The Plaintiff's claims were based on the assertion that she is the rightful owner of Mr. King's remaining estate and that the State was responsible for the distress caused due to the withholding of Mr. King’s estate, including his property and stake in No Vanity Radio.

The Plaintiff’s action was supported by the Estate Tax Act and CCSA Title 1.3 - 9.

SUMMARY OF JUDGMENT:

IT IS THE OPINION of the Court that the State is not civilly liable for withholding or otherwise not dispersing the property owned by Elliot King. The Court does however recognize that Ms. King is the rightful owner of the late Elliot King’s estate and shall be entitled to the residual estate following the resolution of any debts owed by Mr. King.

IT IS ORDERED:

• SARA shall conduct a thorough audit of all properties, assets, and possessions owned by Mr. Elliot King at the time of his passing.

• SARA shall enumerate and document all properties, including but not limited to real estate, vehicles, financial assets, and valuable possessions owned by Mr. Elliot King.

• SARA is authorized to utilize the identified assets to settle any outstanding debts or obligations owed by the deceased in accordance with applicable laws.

• Following the satisfaction of debts, SARA shall return any remaining property to the widow of the deceased, Evangeline Cyrus-King, as prescribed by relevant estate distribution laws.

• SARA is mandated to maintain a comprehensive record of all actions taken during this process, including asset identification, valuation, debt settlement, and property distribution.

• SARA is directed to complete these actions within 7 days from the date of this order and provide a formal response to the Court, confirming compliance and outlining the executed steps, along with a comprehensive record of all assets, debts, and property involved.

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT:

IT IS THE OPINION of the Court that the Plaintiff did not sufficiently prove, on a balance of probabilities, that any agency of the State was liable for failing to transfer ownership of Mr. King’s properties, assets, and licenses to Evangeline Cyrus-King. While Ms. King’s claim to her late husband’s estate was lawful and later substantiated, Mr. King, at the time of his death, had no will established. In such an event, the Estate Tax Act designates the State as the sole executor of Mr. King’s possessions and financial assets for the purpose of settling any debts owed by Mr. King.

The Estate Tax Act contains no provisions requiring specific performance by the State in the event no will is established. Thus, any inaction by the State following the settlement of debts is not, in the opinion of the Court, sufficient to establish liability in favor of the Plaintiff.

However, the Court firmly holds that Ms. King’s claim to Elliot King’s residual estate is to be lawfully recognized under the precedent established in Article I.13 of the San Andreas Constitution and CCSA Title 1.3 (11). Specifically, the Court recognizes this claim in the absence of any superseding claims by the State or successors of Mr. King.

SUMMARY OF COMPLAINT:

THE PLAINTIFF, Callie Steelrex, petitioned the State of San Andreas for disbursement of properties owned by her late husband Jefferson Steelrex and to consider an amendment for the Estate Tax Act, SB-22, to include automatic disbursement of a residual state when a spouse dies.

The Plaintiff’s action was supported by the Estate Tax Act.

SUMMARY OF JUDGMENT:

IT IS THE OPINION of the Court that the State is not civilly liable for withholding or otherwise not dispersing the property owned by a deceased spouse. The Court holds this judgment consistent with the ruling of King v. State.

Furthermore, the Court does not deem it appropriate to issue, enforce, or direct any amendment to SB-22 on account of this action, as no liability can be established by the State in such a matter and there is no mechanism of law for the Court to intervene in such a manner in the absence of liability by the State.

The Court does however recognize that Ms. Steelrex is the rightful owner of the late Jefferson Steelrex’s estate and shall be entitled to the residual estate following the resolution of any debts owed by Mr. Steelrex.

IT IS ORDERED:

• SARA shall conduct a thorough audit of all properties, assets, and possessions owned by Mr. Jefferson Steelrex at the time of his passing.

• SARA shall enumerate and document all properties, including but not limited to real estate, vehicles, financial assets, and valuable possessions owned by Mr. Jefferson Steelrex.

• SARA is authorized to utilize the identified assets to settle any outstanding debts or obligations owed by the deceased in accordance with applicable laws.

• Following the satisfaction of debts, SARA shall return any remaining property to the widow of the deceased, Callie Steelrex, as prescribed by relevant estate distribution laws.

• SARA is mandated to maintain a comprehensive record of all actions taken during this process, including asset identification, valuation, debt settlement, and property distribution.

• SARA is directed to complete these actions within 7 days from the date of this order and provide a formal response to the Court, confirming compliance and outlining the executed steps, along with a comprehensive record of all assets, debts, and property involved.

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT:

IT IS THE OPINION of the Court that the Plaintiff did not sufficiently prove, on a balance of probabilities, that any agency of the State was liable for failing to transfer ownership of the deceased's properties, assets, and licenses to Callie Steelrex. While the Plaintiff’s claim to her late husband’s estate was lawful and later substantiated, Mr. Steelrex, at the time of his death, had no will established. In such an event, the Estate Tax Act designates the State as the sole executor of the deceased’s possessions and financial assets for the purpose of settling any debts owed by the deceased.

The Estate Tax Act contains no provisions requiring specific performance by the State in the event no will is established. Thus, any inaction by the State following the settlement of debts is not, in the opinion of the Court, sufficient to establish liability in favor of the Plaintiff.

The Court firmly holds that Ms. Steelrex’s claim to Jefferson Steelrex’s residual estate is to be lawfully recognized under the precedent established in Article I.13 of the San Andreas Constitution and CCSA Title 1.3 (11). Specifically, the Court recognizes this claim in the absence of any superseding claims by the State or successors of Mr. Jefferson.

SUMMARY OF COMPLAINT:

THE PLAINTIFF, Zeek OnFuego, actioned Skyler Wolfe for an alleged breach of contract by Skyler Wolfe regarding an agreement for management and accounting for Burgershot.

The Plaintiff sought damages in the amount of $403,069, and to have the original contract considered null and void by the Court, canceling any obligation between the parties.

SUMMARY OF JUDGMENT:

IT IS THE OPINION of the Court that, after viewing the relevant contract and substantiating documents, Mr. Wolfe is not civilly liable for damages arising from a breach of contract concerning Burgershot.

It has been determined by the Court, by a preponderance of the evidence, that both parties materially and substantially violated the terms outlined in the contract as written. This substantial deviation from the contract’s terms has rendered it impossible to establish strict liability for either party.

Furthermore, the Court concludes that due to the contract's vague aspects, which impede enforceability, the mutual withdrawn consent by the contract parties, and the failure of both parties to fulfill the original agreement’s conditions, the Court is designating the contract as void as of August 10, 2023. Following this date, no party shall remain bound by any portion of this agreement.

IT IS DETERMINED:

• Any property lawfully owned by Burgershot shall be returned and surrendered to the custody of the registered business owner, Zeek OnFuego.

• Any civil liabilities, past or present, associated with the management and financial administration of Burgershot, whether performed or neglected, shall remain the responsibility of the business and its authorized license holders.

• Neither party shall be eligible to seek further claims or damages from the other arising out of a breach of the agreement.

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT:

The Court's rationale for this verdict is grounded in a particular provision entrenched within the contract. This clause mandated Mr. Zeek OnFuego to fulfill monthly accounting duties, an obligation that was left unaddressed throughout the duration of the contract. The Plaintiff could not provide substantive evidence or documents suggesting a faithful execution (or attempt at such) of this provision of the contract throughout its 11 months of being in effect.

Similarly, the Court considered that the Defendant breached their contractual obligation to provide essential materials for the seamless operation of the business. However, the language of the contract is sufficiently vague such that it could not be determined by the Court if this obligation was willfully breached, or arose out of an oversight by one or both of the parties. Per the guidelines in CCSA Title 3.3 (17-20), the contract in question could not impartially and definitively be interpreted in such a way to ascertain the intention of both parties at the time the agreement was signed. Considering this, the plain language of the contract does not create a specific and clear condition that the Defendant could have breached to warrant strict liability.

Finally, the Court scrutinized the damages and concluded that the main sum of $403,069 was primarily linked to investments Mr. OnFuego executed on behalf of Burgershot, specifically involving properties registered under Burgershot. The Court could not reasonably impose damages on the Defendant for an investment initiated by the Plaintiff in their own enterprise.

Given the significant breaches and the resultant implications for the contract's original intent, the Court's verdict finds solid justification.

SUMMARY OF COMPLAINT:

THE PLAINTIFF, Martin Stone, actioned the Los Santos Police Department (LSPD), the Defendant, for criminal liability citing 1.303 Murder (Attempted) and 4.204 Brandishing a Weapon. The Plaintiff also actioned the Defendant for alleged violations of Article I.12 of the State Constitution, citing cruel and unusual punishment via excessive fines imposed. The Plaintiff sought $10,000 in standalone compensatory damages, compensation for legal bills, and additional compensation totalling $1,000 for each point of lost credit score as a result of the fines received. The Plaintiff alleged that during an encounter with the Defendant, they were fired upon by class 3 weapons unlawfully by the Defendant.

SUMMARY OF JUDGMENT:

IT IS THE OPINION of the Court that the Plaintiff has demonstrated, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the Defendant is liable under CCSA 5.2.1 for 1.302 (Aggravated Assault) during the encounter with the Plaintiff. However, the Court did not find the Defendant to be liable for civil violations under Article I.12 of the State Constitution, nor did the Court find a compelling reason to award damages based on changes to Mr. Stone’s credit score in this matter.

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT:

IT IS THE OPINION of the Court that the legal question of whether criminal liability could be established in relation to the conduct of the Defendant and to what extent the Plaintiff could prove that damages were a direct result of said conduct. Testimonies from witnesses, multiple on-scene officers, and high-ranking members of the department were evaluated to determine if the encounter warranted lethal force.

The Court noted that Mr. Stone was unarmed and operating a heavy bulldozer during the encounter, which collided with an armored police vehicle, causing damage. No other individuals were reported to be harmed. Following the collision, an LSPD officer reportedly fired upon the bulldozer using a class three weapon. Mr. Stone and others were arrested, fined for Reckless Endangerment and Unlawful Obstruction, and subsequently released.

Notwithstanding internal LSPD Standard Operating Procedures, the Court considers force reasonable if and only if it meets the following requirements, cited from CCSA 9.06:

1. The use of force must be justified by an immediate and proximate threat to the safety of officers and/or members of the public, and

2. The use of force has no adequate legal alternative, and

3. The use of force must not create a greater danger or threat to others, and

4. The use of force must be employed with a reasonable belief that the action is necessary to prevent further harm.

The Court holds that the Defendant does not enjoy special privileges with regard to these standards, and that compliance with internal procedures does not override the necessity for adherence to established legal criteria. 

In considering this matter, the Court finds that the actions of the Defendant violated both the 2nd and 3rd requirements outlined above. Namely that while there may have been a threat to officers on-scene posed by Mr. Stone, that the threat did not warrant the level of force used because appropriate legal alternatives were available that would not have created a disproportionate level of danger to those on scene. The actions of the Defendant following the arrest were also inconsistent with the actions immediately preceding it: if the actions of Mr. Stone were sufficient to create a level of danger to the public so severe it warranted a lethal response, then the Court finds no sound justification for why the Defendant would choose to release Mr. Stone with solely misdemeanor fines. In investigating this matter, the Court could not establish, through police documentation, testimony, or otherwise, that the conduct of Mr. Stone or his associates created a level of threat that demonstrated the need for a lethal response.

The Court did not find that the actions of the Defendant established criminal liability for 1.303 Murder (Attempted), as responding to a perceived threat, even with a disproportionate level of force, does not satisfy the “reckless indifference” standard in the statute. The facts of the matter also do not appear to satisfy any other definition under 1.303, which requires either the affirmative intention to kill or the determination of guilt of another felony, which was beyond the scope of this matter. In place of this, the court considers the Defendant liable for 1.302 Aggravated Assault against Mr. Stone which finds a more solid basis in the undisputed facts of the case.

Regarding Mr. Stone’s credit score and petition for compensatory damages, the Court rejects this claim as there was no substantial evidence provided that fines issued by the Defendant would unjustly impact Mr. Stone’s credit in a way that the Defendant would be liable for. Additionally, the Court was not able to rule specifically on the merits of the criminal charges brought against Mr. Stone due to the scope of the case. As such, these fines have not been adjusted or considered by the Court in deciding the total amount of compensation owed to Mr. Stone. Claims resulting out of said fines are dismissed without prejudice. 

All other claims in this matter not listed above are dismissed with prejudice.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:

• That the Plaintiff shall be entitled to compensatory damages enumerated as follows:

  • $5,000 in standalone compensatory damages.

  • $41,400 in additional compensatory damages for legal fees.

  • $15,000 in punitive damages.

  • $10,000 in reimbursement (from the Court) for the legal filing fee.

  • Total compensation in the amount of $71,400.